Abstract
Introduction
During much of its history, the Federal Reserve has implemented monetary policy by targeting short-term interest rates-since the mid-1970s, the federal funds rate. A number of analysts have recently suggested that open market operations may not be essential to moving short-term interest rates. Following up on an observation by McCallum (1995) , Guthrie and Wright (2000) and Taylor (2001) develop models where private agents drive the interbank rate to the level desired by the monetary authority.
Guthrie and Wright suggest that such open mouth operations might "explain the difficulties in substantiating liquidity effects in empirical work." 2 The open mouth hypothesis has also been suggested by Meulendyke (1998) and Hanes (1998) , who argue that since it began announcing target changes in 1994, the Fed has not needed to use open market operations to move the federal funds rate.
Taylor ( Because of this, open mouth operations can only account for the lack of evidence of a liquidity effect using relatively high-frequency data (e.g., Hamilton, 1997, and Thornton, 2001b) . Assuming that the Fed must fulfill the market's expectation relatively soon, say within a reserve maintenance period, it is unlikely that the open-mouth hypothesis can account for the lack of a liquidity effect using monthly or lower-frequency data (e.g., Pagan and Robertson, 1995, and Thornton, 2001a) . Hence, the open market and open mouth hypotheses can be viewed as specific forms of the liquidity effect hypothesis, which asserts that changes in short-term interest rates are due to the exogenous actions of the Fed.
There is another hypothesis that can account for the lack of evidence of a liquidity effect, which I call the interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis. It could also be called the policy inertia hypothesis because it is based on the assumptions that (1) monetary policy is implemented using a nominal interest rate target and (2) policymakers are slow to change their nominal interest rate target in response to economic shocks. The interestrate-smoothing hypothesis, which is reflected in several models (e.g., Goodfriend, 1987 , 1991 , and Barro, 1989 , asserts that economic shocks cause movements in the equilibrium interest rate. When such shocks occur, the Fed has two options. It can either attempt to offset the effect of the shock and, thereby, "smooth" the transition of rates to their new equilibrium or it can change its interest rate target. The degree of "interest rate smoothing is determined by how quickly policymakers change the policy rate.
This paper investigates the extent to which the liquidity effect or interest rate smoothing is responsible for changes in market rates using a two-step procedure. In the 2 Guthrie and Wright (2000) , p. 513.
first step, the open market and open mouth hypotheses are directly tested by exploiting the close relationship between the federal funds rate and the Fed's federal funds rate target using a methodology similar to that used by Cook and Hahn (1989a) .
The open market and open mouth hypotheses assert the Fed moves the funds rate to the new equilibrium level determined by policymakers when the Fed changes its target for the funds rate. In contrast, the interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis asserts the Fed initially engages in endogenous open market operations to temporarily prevent the funds rate from moving to the new equilibrium level determined by market forces.
Consequently, evidence that market rates are moved by exogenous changes in the funds rate target would lead to a rejection of the interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis. If, however, there is no evidence supporting either the open market or open mouth hypotheses, the interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis is a viable alternative. Consequently, I consider a variety of evidence that is consistent with the interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis and discuss other aspects of the hypothesis that make it worthy of more consideration than it has received in the monetary policy literature.
It is important to emphasize that the question being addressed is "Has the Fed changed interest rates through open market operations?" not "Can the Fed change interest rates through open market operations?" Given the size of the market for reserves relative to the Fed's capacity to alter reserve availability, there is little doubt that the Fed could affect the federal funds rate through open market operations. The fact that the Fed has the capacity to affect rates does not, ipso facto, establish that it has done so.
Open Market, Open Mouth and Interest-Rate-Smoothing Hypotheses
The open market hypothesis is well known and, hence, requires little elaboration. would respond to policy actions even if market participants were unaware that the Fed was targeting interest rates or that it had changed the target.
The Interest-Rate-Smoothing Hypothesis
In contrast to these hypotheses, the interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis asserts that some changes in the nominal interest rate target are due to shocks to the real economy or inflation expectations. The interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis is implicit in many policy models, (e.g., Goodfriend, 1987 , 1991 , and Barro, 1989 . In its extreme form, the interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis suggests that all target changes are endogenous responses to economic shocks. As Goodfriend (1991, p. 10) , puts it, "…it should not be said that a Federal funds rate target change causes a change in market rates since the Fed is merely reacting to events in much the same way as the private sector does. More generally, to the extent that we believe the Fed reacts purposefully to economic events, we should not say that funds rate target changes are ever the fundamental cause of market rate changes, since both are driven by more fundamental shocks.
Of course, such shocks may originate either in the private sector or the Fed, the latter as policy mistakes or shifts in political pressure on the Fed."
Of course, the Fed need not have an explicit objective of smoothing interest rates. Woodford (1999) argues that it is difficult to rationalize interest rate smoothing as an objective in policymakers' loss function. It is sufficient that policymakers are slow to change their target rate in response to a shock, so that they automatically conduct open market operations to resist pressure on the funds rate caused by economic shocks.
This feature of the interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis was an important element of the monetarist attack on the Fed's funds rate targeting procedure in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Friedman, 1968) . Monetarist argued that shocks that affect interest rates cause a change in the stance of monetary policy unless policymakers immediately adjust their nominal interest rate target sufficiently. The endogeneity of the stance of monetary policy to shocks to the economic environment under interest rate targeting is well established and is critical to policy evaluations based on the Taylor rule (e.g., Taylor, 1999 , Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999 , 2000 operations to move the funds rate. It will be sufficient that they no longer attempt to restrain it. Third, the change in the funds rate will occur even if the market is unaware that the funds rate target has been changed. 4 Of course, an announcement of the decision to change the target would likely expedite the process.
The Funds Rate and Other Short-Term Interest Rates
Because open market operations directly effect the supply of reserves, they necessarily affect the federal funds rate. Friedman, 1999; McCloskey, 2000; Thornton, 1995) . Because of this, the size of open market operations required to offset economic shocks to other interest rates could be much larger than is practical, given that banks rely on reserves both to meet their reserve requirements and to conduct daily operations. Because of this, the Fed could have an incentive to adjust the funds rate target relatively quickly, especially to shocks that result in relatively large changes in other short-term rates. Cook and Hahn (1989a) were the first to investigate the market's reaction to changes in the funds rate target. 
The Market's Reaction to Target Changes

Distinguishing Between the Open Market and Open Mouth Hypotheses
To distinguish between the open market hypothesis and the open mouth hypothesis, it is important to partition target changes into those the market knew had occurred and those the market was unaware had occurred. This is accomplished by comparing WSJ-announced target changes with actual target changes provided by Rudebusch (1995ab Type 1: The Fed injected or drained reserves when the funds rate was at the funds rate target.
Type 2: The Fed injected (drained) reserves when the funds rate was trading below (above) the previously targeted rate.
Type 3: The funds rate moved above or below the previous target before the Fed took action to restrain the funds rate from moving further.
Type 4: The funds rate moved above or below the target without the Fed taking action.
The type 1 changes are textbook examples of exogenous open market operations.
The funds rate is trading at the target level and the Fed attempts to push the rate higher more than the currently reported target change. When the number of gaps is added to the 76 WSJ-reported changes, the total number of changes is only one short of the 98 target changes reported by Rudebusch. 9 It is not surprising because the Fed was intentionally more secretive then than it is today (e.g., Goodfriend, 1986) . Motivated in part by a desire to be secretive, the Fed entered the market frequently during this period, often buying and selling government securities on the same day, see Friedman (1981) , Friedman (1982ab) and Levin and Meulendyke (1982) . 10 See Cook and Hahn (1989a) , p. 342 for a defense of this assumption.
(lower) by draining (injecting) reserves. Type 2 changes are similar, except that the funds rate had already moved before the Fed took action consistent with pushing the funds rate further in the same direction. For type 3 and type 4 changes, however, the causation clearly goes from the funds rate to the funds rate target. The Fed either took actions to offset in part the movement in the funds rate or did nothing.
Each type of target change is noted in Treasury rates are determined simultaneously with the federal funds rate. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that these rates are cointegrated (e.g., Stock and Watson, 1988; Sarno and Thornton, 2002) . To control for the dynamic interaction between these rates, the vector error correction model,
The error correction term is denoted EC, d denotes a 2 by 1 vector of coefficients that measure the speed with which the federal funds and T-bill rates return to their long-run equilibrium relationship, b denotes a 2 by 1 vector of coefficients that measure the response of the T-bill and federal funds rates to 12 Neither rate would respond if the target changes were anticipated. This is not a serious problem because this requires market participants to correctly anticipate both the timing and magnitude of target changes. Moreover, the fact that the T-bill rate responds significantly to WSJ target changes indicates that these changes were not completely anticipated. Finally, because type 1 target changes (and to a lesser extent, type 2 changes) appear to be exogenous with respect to the funds rate, they are more likely to be unanticipated than type 3 or type 4 target changes and, hence, generate a larger response of the T-bill rate. changes in the funds rate target and Y( ) L is the usual matrix polynomial in the lag operator L.
The model is estimated using WSJ target changes and actual target changes, and with various partitions of each. Cook and Hahn (1989a) omit the target change that occurred on November 1, 1978, the day on which the Fed and the Treasury announced a program to support the dollar. 13 The results are insensitive to whether this observation is included or excluded, so it is included here for completeness.
One of the WSJ-reported target changes occurred on the heels of a very soft federal funds market on the last reserve settlement day of the year. Because the funds rate was uncharacteristically low on the previous market day, the decrease in the WSJreported target was associated with a 468-basis point change in the funds rate. Since this could bias the results, a dummy variable that is one on this day and zero elsewhere is included in the funds rate equation. Dummy variables were also included for settlement Wednesdays, settlement Thursdays, the first and last days of the quarter and the first and last days of the year. 
Market Perceptions and Reality
The model is estimated assuming a constant in the cointegrating vector. In all cases, the usual likelihood ratio test indicates a single cointegrating vector. Because the estimated cointegrating vector is relatively insensitive to the funds rate target series used, the estimated cointegating vector is held constant for all of the estimates reported in 13 There was a very large reaction in foreign exchange markets in response to this action (e.g., Mudd (1979) and Batten and Thornton (1985) ) and a significant fall in longer-term interest rates. This action appears to have had little effect on the T-bill rate.
Tables 2-4. The standard errors are estimated using the Newey andWest (1987) consistent covariance estimator.
Estimates of the model using WSJ target changes are presented in Table 2 . To conserve space, only estimates of the constant term, d and b are presented. The estimate of b for the T-bill rate, 0.526, is similar to Cook and Hahn's (1989a) estimate, 0.554. 15 The response of the T-bill rate is smaller when WSJ changes do not coincide with actual target changes, but the difference is not statistically significant. Hence, the evidence indicates that the market's reaction is the same when market analysts concluded that the Fed had changed the funds rate target whether the target was changed or not.
The federal funds rate also responds significantly to WSJ-announced target changes; however, the magnitude of the response is considerably smaller than that of the T-bill rate. Moreover, the funds rate responds significantly to WSJ target changes only when they coincide with actual target changes, suggesting that the significant movement in the funds rate might be due to open market operations.
This interpretation of the funds rate response depends on whether the target change is endogenous or exogenous. Consequently, the 76 WSJ target changes are partitioned according to type. The results are presented in Table 3 . The results for the federal funds rate do not support the open market hypothesis. Specifically, the funds rate responds significantly only to endogenous target changes and not to type 1 or type 2 target changes. The statistically significant relationship between the funds rate and type 3 and type 4 WSJ target changes is due to reverse causation and, therefore, is evidence of the liquidity effect. Indeed, consistent with market analysts' observations, the coefficient for type 3 changes is larger than for type 4 changes; although, the difference is not statistically significant.
While the magnitude of the response of the T-bill rate varies somewhat by type, the hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected for any possible pairing of types or for the equality of response of all types, including the three target changes that could not be classified. When market analysts announced that the target had changed, the market reacted regardless of whether the target had actually changed. Consequently, the response of the T-bill rate to WSJ-announced target changes is an announcement effect. 
The Market's Response to Actual Target Changes
The conclusion that the Fed did not influence the funds rate through open market operations is also supported by estimates of the response to the 99 actual target changes presented in Table 4 . Consistent with the previous findings, the T-bill responds significantly to the 39 target changes that were reported in the WSJ. The response of the T-bill rate to the 60 target changes that were not reported in the WSJ is significantly different from zero, but significantly smaller than the response to the 39 reported changes. 15 Cook and Hahn estimated the equation only using days when the target was changed. When this is done, the estimates are nearly identical to those reported in Table 1 , and the Adj. R 2 and estimated standard error are nearly identical to theirs. Differences are likely attributable to small differences in the T-bill rate used. 16 Announcement effects are common. Market rates have, at various times and under various circumstances, responded significantly to a variety of news: money surprises (e.g., Hardouvelis (1987) and Thornton (1989) ), changes in the discount rate (e.g., Thornton (1994 Thornton ( , 1998 Thornton ( , 2000b , Roley and Troll (1984) , Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) , Cook and Hahn (1988) , Batten and Thornton (1984, 1985) ), the employment report (e.g., Hardouvelis (1987) and Cook and Korn (1991) ) and other special announcements (Cook and Hahn (1988) ). What is often not known, and is difficult to determine, is precisely why markets react to this information, e.g., Thornton (1998). Moreover, the response of the T-bill rate to the 60 actual target changes is fragile.
17 This is illustrated in Figure 1 Hahn's conclusion that the significant response of Treasury rates to WSJ-reported target changes is evidence of a liquidity effect. Rather the response of the T-bill rate is an announcement effect.
The evidence for the open mouth hypothesis is less clear. It was widely known
that the Fed was targeting the funds rate and considerable resources were devoted to "Fed watching." Despite the evidence that market analysts frequently missed the timing and/or magnitude of funds rate target changes, it is reasonable to assume that they should have been able to determine that the target had changed within a few days of the change. 
Evidence From the Post-Nonborrowed Reserves Targeting Period
A stronger test of the open mouth hypothesis can be obtained by estimating the market's reaction to funds rate target changes after the Fed switched from its nonborrowed reserve operation procedure in October 1982. Sometime between October 18 Sensitivity to outliers is not unusual in studies of the market's reaction to specific news, e.g., Thornton (1989) . 19 If open mouth operations account for the relationship between the funds rate and the funds rate target, the deviations of the funds rate from the target should be larger a few days after a target change that the market was unaware had occurred. The standard deviation of the funds rate from the funds rate target for the three days after target changes that were missed by the WSJ, however, is only slightly larger than for the entire sample period, 0.15 and 0.13, respectively. Likewise, the average absolute spread between the funds rate and target (10 basis points) was only 1-basis point higher (the results are nearly identical if two days are used).
1982 and the late 1980s the Fed began explicitly targeting the federal funds rate, but the market was unaware of it.
It is useful to briefly review the chronology of the events. After explicitly targeting the federal funds rate for a number of year, in October 1979 the Fed switched to targeting M1 using a nonborrowed reserves operating procedure in order to reduce inflation (Meulendyke, 1998) . When the relationship between M1 and nominal GNP broke down in the early 1980s, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) abandoned M1 targeting began targeting borrowed reserves (Wallich, 1984 , Strongin, 1995 , and Meulendyke, 1998 difference between the funds rate and the funds rate target was just 17 basis points, with a standard deviation of 26 basis points, and on 44 percent of the days the funds rate deviated from the funds rate target by fewer than 10 basis points. 22 The relationship was closer during the period from September 13, 1974 through October 5, 1979, when the average absolute spread was 9 basis points, the standard deviation was 13 basis points, and on 72 percent of the days the funds rate deviated from the funds rate target by fewer than 10 basis points. The relationship between these rates in the early 1980s is more similar to that for the period October 2, 1989 to December 31, 1997, when the mean absolute spread was 11 basis points, the standard deviation was 19 basis points, and the funds rate deviated from the funds rate target by fewer than 10 basis points on 67 percent of the days.
When Did the Market Know that the Fed Was Targeting the Funds Rate?
While not conclusive, the evidence noted above strongly suggests that the Fed was explicitly targeting the funds rate before 1990. If market analysts were aware that the Fed was targeting the funds rate, it is reasonable to assume that they would be able to identify some of the target changes on the day they were made, as they did during the 1970s. If this is the case, the T-bill rate should respond to target changes fairly soon after the market became aware that the Fed was targeting the funds rate.
To test the whether the market was aware that the Fed was targeting the funds rate before the late 1980s, Equation 1 was estimated partitioning target changes into those that occurred before 1991 and after 1990-the date identified by Poole, Rasche and Thornton (2002) . The results, presented in Table 5 , show that the response of the T-bill rate was small and only marginally significant before 1991; however, it was more than three times larger and highly significant after 1990. Hence, consistent with the findings of Poole, Rasche and , these results suggest that the market was unaware that the 
The Interest-Rate-Smoothing Hypothesis
The interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis asserts the Fed does not move rates per se, but rather changes its target for the nominal interest rate in response to economic shocks.
This section reviews evidence that is consistent with the interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis.
The Relationship Between Interest Rates and Narrow Money and Reserve Aggregates
The liquidity effect hypothesis suggests there should be a strong negative relationship between interest rates and narrow monetary and reserve aggregates that are most closely linked to open market operations. The interest rate smoothing hypothesis; however, suggests that the relationship between interest rates and such aggregates should be positive. Consistent with the latter hypothesis, the historical relationship between interest rates and such monetary aggregates is positive (e.g., Pagan and Robertson, 1995; and Thornton, 2001a ).
The exception is nonborrowed reserves. Thornton (2001a) has shown, however, that the strong negative contemporaneous correlation between nonborrowed reserves and short-term interest rates is a consequence of the fact that the Fed has an incentive to offset changes in borrowing when it is targeting the federal funds rate and has done so historically. 25 Even when nonborrowed reserves is used, the size of the estimated liquidity effect is small. Indeed, Pagan and Robertson (1995) conclude that "most of the factors historically driving the federal funds rate do not seem to be due to the Fed…" 26 .
Policy Inertia
The interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis is also consistent with observations that the Fed has historically targeted nominal interest rates and has been slow to adjust its interest rate target. 27 For example, Goodfriend (1991, p. 10) notes that the target is adjusted at "irregular intervals only after sufficient information has been accumulated to trigger a target change."
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If policymakers are slow to respond to shocks to the economy (for whatever reason), one might expect such shocks to be reflected in wide array of economic variables-including market interest rates-before the Fed acts. If market rates move in advance of the funds rate target, it does not necessarily mean that the Fed responded to the change in interest rates per se, since, as Goodfriend suggest, both events are driven by the same cause. It is merely a consequence of the fact that private economic agents respond more quickly than policymakers to economic shocks.
Temporal Ordering
The interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis also implies that changes in market interest rates will precede changes in the funds rate target. A test of temporal ordering, called Granger causality test, strongly supports this implication. 29 Of course, the temporal ordering between the funds rate target and market rates is also implied by the expectations hypothesis. Support for the expectations hypothesis is generally weak, however, and is particularly weak when the short-term rate is the effective federal funds rate and the long-term rate is a short-term T-bill rate (e.g., Hardouvelis, 1988 , Simon, 1990 , Roberds, Runkle and Whiteman, 1996 . In the absence of evidence that differentiates between these alternative explanations, the interest-ratesmoothing is as plausible an explanation as the expectations hypothesis for the observed temporal ordering.
The 1989 Experience
The interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis is also consistent with an experience when the Fed seemed particularly slow to change its funds rate target. After rising in 1988 and early 1989, interest rates peaked in March 1989 and began to fall. At the time, inflation was running at an unacceptably high rate-in excess of 4 percent. Given the high inflation rate and the FOMC objective of reducing the trend rate of inflation, on February 24, 1989, the Board of Governors raised the discount rate by 50 basis points, citing a desire "to implement in a visible way the System's continuing commitment to the fight against inflation…" 30 The increase in the discount rate was accompanied by a 18.75-basis-point increase in the target for the federal funds rate, which came on the heels of two 25-basis-point increases on February 14 and 23. The Fed further indicated its desire for a restrictive monetary policy by raising the funds rate target modestly by 6.25 basis points on May 4.
Despite increases in the discount rate and the funds rate target, short-term interest rates began to decline. The T-bill rate declined by about 85 basis points between its peak in March and June 5-the day before the first of three 25-basis-point cuts in the funds rate target. A second 25-basis-point target reduction occurred on July 7 and a third on July 27. An additional 6.25-basis-point cut occurred on August 10. The Fed cut the funds rate target even though its outlook for the economy and inflation was essentially unchanged. 31 Indeed, CPI inflation in 1989 was about 75 basis points higher than in
1988.
Consistent with the interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis, total reserves decreased by $0.89 billion during the period from February to May. This is the largest three-month decline in total reserves in the entire period from January 1959 to March 1995. 32 This is remarkable because consecutive monthly decreases in reserves are uncommon owing to the need to increase the monetary base to meet the growing demand for currency. The effect of these actions on banks was direct and substantial. M1-which had been 30 Board of Governors (1989) , p. 67. 31 Greenbook's fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter forecasts for economic growth and inflation (fixed weighted GDP deflator), respectively were: February 1 meeting, 3.0 and 4.4 percent; March 22 meeting, 2.9 and 4.7 percent; May 10 meeting, 2.8 and 4.7 percent; June 28 meeting, 2.2 and 4.5 percent; and the August 16 meeting, 2.4 and 4.3 percent. 32 Banks began implementing sweep programs in March 1995 in order to avoid the reserve tax. Since these programs have been implemented, reserve growth has been negative.
growing at about a 3.5 percent rate during the previous year-declined by $11 billion between February and June 1989.
33
The Fed's effort to maintain the funds rate appears to have been successful.
Despite the significant decline in other short-term interest rates, the federal funds rate remained close to the Fed's target during the period of the unchanged target. Hence, consistent with the conventional open market view of monetary policy, the Fed appears to exert considerable control over the federal funds rate. By mid-May, however, the funds rate was trading below the target and the market began to revise its expectations for the funds rate for June and beyond (see Poole, Rasche and Thornton, 2002 , the appendix, for details).
The Frequency of Federal Funds Rate Target Changes
Finally, changes in the funds rate target have often been more frequent than would suggested if they represented exogenous monetary policy actions. Target changes were especially frequent during the 1974-1979 period, when the Fed adjusted the funds rate target 99 times-an average of about once every 2.5 weeks. The median number of days between target changes during this period was 6.
Prior to 1994, most of the target changes were made during intermeeting periods.
The Desk initiated many of these, presumably with the advice and consent of the Chairman. Indeed, the Fed has acknowledged that some of the target changes during the 1980s were a response to shifts in demand (e.g., Thornton and Wheelock, 2000, p. 6) . 33 It appears that the move to reduce the funds rate target was initially driven by concerns about slow money growth. At the June 5, 1989, conference call, Chairman Greenspan noted that his two reasons for lowering the funds rate were "(1) the money supply data and (2) evidence that is emerging that the commodity price inflation is beginning to subdue." (Transcrpits of conference call on June 5, 1989, p. 3) . Moreover, at the July 5-6, 1989, FOMC meeting, the Chairman noted that "I wouldn't be particularly concerned were it not for the fact that, at this stage, I do think the money supply data-even though
Discussion
This paper investigates whether relationship between the federal funds rate and Moreover, a more detailed analysis of Cook and Hahn's (1989a) The interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis is consistent with the observation that Fed appears to be slow to adjust its funds rate, as well as a number of empirical facts, such as, projected with some optimism to strengthen-are really quite restrained." (Transcript of the FOMC of July 5-6, 1989, p. 48) .
(1) the inability of researchers to find a significant liquidity effect using narrow money and reserve aggregates, (2) the strong tendency of the funds rate target to follow changes in market rates and (3) the fact that during some periods target changes were far more frequent than rational monetary policy would suggest is necessary. It is also supported by the behavior of the funds rate target and reserves during the early part of 1989, when the Fed was particularly slow to adjust the funds rate target.
The extent to which changes in the funds rate target are exogenous policy actions or endogenous responses to exogenous economic shocks goes to the heart of monetary policy identification. Recent attempts at identification in context of the Taylor rule (e.g., Taylor, 1999 and Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999 , 2000 are useful. To date, however, analysts have only considered the endogenous response of the policy rate to changes in inflation or inflation expectations, and not to shocks to the real rate.
Additional evidence might be obtained by attempting to directly distinguish between endogenous and exogenous changes in the Fed's funds rate target, perhaps through a detailed analysis of Fed documents to identify target changes that were reactions to specific economic shocks and those that were not. 34 For a recent attempt to include monetary aggregates in assessing policy, see Leeper and Zha (2001) . Asterisk indicates the number of days after the last actual target Change, where * 1 day after, ** 2 days after, *** 3 or more days after (n) indicates the type of the WSJ target change. 
